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COMMENT
A MODEL FOR FIXING IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE AFTER
PERRY V NEW HAMPSHIRE
Robert Couch*
Mistaken eyewitness identifications are the leading cause of wrongful con-
victions. In 1977, a time when the problems with eyewitness identifications
had been acknowledged but were not yet completely understood, the Su-
preme Court announced a test designed to exclude unreliable eyewitness
evidence. This standard has proven inadequate to protect against mistaken
identifications. Despite voluminous scientific studies on the failings of eye-
witness identification evidence and the growing number of DNA
exonerations, the Supreme Court's outdated reliability test remains in
place today. In 2012, in Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court
commented on its standard for evaluating eyewitness evidence for the first
time in thirty-five years and ultimately declined to modify the outdated re-
liability framework. This Comment analyzes Perry in light of innovations
by states to improve eyewitness evidence procedures. While the Perry deci-
sion failed to address critical problems with the reliability test, the Court
indirectly pointed to ways in which the old standard must be fixed.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 29, 1984, an intruder broke into a North Carolina home and
sexually assaulted a college student named Jennifer Thompson.' Thompson
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School. Special thanks to
Dave Moran and the rest of the Michigan Innocence Clinic. Thank you as well to my note
editors, Maggie Mettler, Spencer Winters, Johanna Dennehy, and Robert O'Loughlin. Finally,
thanks to my family for their support and encouragement.
I. State v. Cotton, 394 S.E.2d 456, 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). For a description of the
Ronald Cotton Story, see Mike Celizic, She Sent Him to Jail for Rape; Now They're Friends,




was determined to survive the attack and wanted to make sure her assailant
went to prison. She studied her assailant intently-making sure to memorize
his voice, face, and demeanor. Thompson would later identify Ronald Cot-
ton from a police lineup and consistently maintain that she was 100 percent
certain of her identification.
Cotton was later convicted of the crime, largely due to the strength of
Thompson's identification. While Cotton sat in prison, Thompson remained
sure of her identification. Years later, a man named Bobby Poole confessed
to the crime. Cotton was granted a retrial where Thompson viewed him side
by side with Poole. With Cotton's face firmly entrenched in her mind,
Thompson again identified him as her rapist and Cotton remained behind
bars. In 1995, DNA testing showed that Poole was indeed the perpetrator.
Cotton had spent a decade in prison for a crime he had not committed.' Un-
fortunately, cases like Cotton's are not uncommon, as DNA testing has
proven that many wrongful convictions were based on mistaken eyewitness
identifications.
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite created a test for
determining whether eyewitness evidence obtained through suggestive
circumstances could nevertheless be admitted into evidence.3 Under the
Manson test, if an identification was unnecessarily suggestive, a court must
weigh certain reliability factors against the corrupting influence of the sug-
gestive procedures to determine whether the identification is reliable and
therefore admissible.4 In the thirty-five years since this decision, scientific
studies and DNA-based exonerations have shown eyewitness identification
to be even less reliable than the Court suspected. The Court returned to the
issue of the reliability of eyewitness identifications in a 2012 case, Perry v.
New Hampshire, for the first time since 1977.5 But the Court avoided press-
ing questions concerning the continued vitality of its outdated reliability
standard, and left unresolved the issue of how to adequately handle eyewit-
ness evidence.
This Comment argues that, given the decision in Perry, the onus is on
the states, and in particular state supreme courts, to implement improved
safeguards ensuring the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence. Part
I describes the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Manson v. Brathwaite and
provides a brief look at the scientific developments that changed experts'
understanding of eyewitness evidence. Part II addresses the Court's decision
in Perry and asserts that the Court avoided a critique of the Manson stand-
ard. Part III suggests that the Supreme Court's unwillingness to address the
issue in Perry indicates that change must come from the states. The New
2. Thompson and Cotton became friends and have written a book together about their
experience. They both advocate for changing the ways in which eyewitness evidence is col-
lected and used. JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO & RONALD COTTON WITH ERIN TORNEO,
PICKING COTTON (2009).
3. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
4. Id. at 114.
5. 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
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Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Henderson is a model for this
type of change.
6
I. MANSON v BRATHWAITE: AN UNRELIABLE FRAMEWORK
This Part describes the Manson reliability standard as developed by the
Supreme Court, as well as the subsequent scientific developments that have
drawn this approach into question. The Manson Court held that a finding of
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures does not mandate
exclusion.' The key phrase from Manson involves the reliability of the
eyewitness's identification of the defendant: "[R]eliability is the linchpin in
determining the admissibility of identification testimony."8 The Court made
clear that the trial judge should use a totality of the circumstances test,
weighing "the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification" against the
perceived reliability of the identification.9
The application of the Manson rule has essentially led courts to use a
two-step process. First, a trial court decides whether the eyewitness identifi-
cation was obtained through unnecessarily suggestive circumstances.
Second, the court must consider whether the suggestive circumstances ren-
der the resulting identification unreliable by weighing the corrupting
influence of the suggestiveness against five reliability factors.10 A defendant
must be successful at both steps in order to exclude the identification evi-
dence.
While the Manson Court identified suggestiveness and reliability as the
principal concerns in eyewitness identification cases, its analysis only
scratched the surface of the many problems surrounding the evidentiary reli-
ability of eyewitness evidence. Since Manson, scientific studies and
developments in DNA testing have shed further light on the failings of eye-
witness evidence, and have revealed that the Court did not anticipate just
how unreliable such evidence can be.
A number of scientific studies in the 1970s and 1980s raised serious
concerns about the ability of juries to assess the probative value of eyewit-
ness evidence, providing much more information than was available when
6. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
7. Manson, 432 U.S. at 106 ("The admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and
unnecessary identification procedure does not violate due process so long as the identification
possesses sufficient aspects of reliability.").
8. Id. at 114.
9. Id.
10. These five reliability factors include "the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior
description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the
time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the cor-




the Court decided Manson." Examples of the findings of these studies in-
clude determinations that juries were not able to distinguish between
accurate and inaccurate witnesses," that the confidence of a witness in her
identification did not correspond to the accuracy of that identification, 3 and
that law-enforcement agencies often did not have clear and consistent pro-
cedures to ensure a "fair" identification. 14 A thorough review of the
empirical research during this time period is beyond the focus of this Com-
ment. However, the key findings from these studies are that eyewitness
evidence presented to juries was often unreliable and that juries were unable
to give proper weight to such evidence.
The development of DNA testing in the mid-1980s confirmed that unre-
liable eyewitness evidence played a large role in sending innocent people to
jail. A 2005 University of Michigan study analyzed 340 exonerations from
1989 through 2003 and found that "[t]he most common cause of wrongful
convictions is eyewitness misidentification."'15 The report also concluded
that the problem was widespread and systematic, as known wrongful con-
victions were certainly outnumbered by unknown wrongful convictions.
16
Similarly, a 2006 article stated that misidentification accounts for more
wrongful convictions than all other causes combined. 7
DNA-based exonerations have thus confirmed that the Manson test is an
inadequate means of excluding unreliable and mistaken eyewitness identifi-
cations. The most obvious problem with the Manson standard is that it was
developed based on a limited understanding of the unreliability of eyewit-
ness evidence. As a result, the Manson Court's method of exclusion falls
short in two ways. First, the reliability factors set out in Manson have prov-
en inadequate in determining whether a trial court should exclude
eyewitness evidence. Scientific studies have proven that the factors do not
11. See Gary L. Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Perfor-
mance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 276
(1980) ("Fortunately, we now have some answers that did not exist as recently as 1978 .... ").
12. See Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness
Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440 (1979) (finding that jurors were unable to detect
differences between accurate eyewitness identifications and mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tions).
13. See Michael R. Leippe, Effects of Integrative Memorial and Cognitive Processes on
the Correspondence of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 261,
262 (1980) ("[I]n light of current research, instances of judges and jurors discounting the
accurate but uncertain witness or, worse, being firmly persuaded by the confident but inaccu-
rate witness, are probably common courtroom happenings.").
14. See Gary L. Wells et al., Guidelines for Empirically Assessing the Fairness of a
Lineup, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 285, 291 (1979).
15. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005).
16. Id. at 531 ("[T]he false convictions that come to light are the tip of an iceberg. Be-
neath the surface there are other undetected miscarriages of justice ... without testable DNA
17. Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systematic Reforms, 2006 Wis. L. REV.
615, 623.
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provide an accurate gauge for assessing reliability and that the list of factors
is substantially incomplete.18 Indeed, some state courts have refined their
versions of the Manson test to use reliability factors with a firmer grounding
in social science.' 9 Second, the Manson factors have, in practice, become a
checklist that is used to admit eyewitness evidence if a trial court finds cer-
tain criteria.20 Instead of engaging in a fact-specific inquiry, lower courts
often mechanically apply the outdated Manson factors and admit evidence
that still raises serious reliability concerns.
II. PERRY V NEW HAMPSHIRE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
UNWILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER MANSON
In January of 2012, the Supreme Court decided Perry v. New Hamp-
shire, addressing the issue of eyewitness identifications for the first time in
thirty-five years." The mounting body of evidence that eyewitness identifi-
cations were unreliable heightened the degree of interest in the case. Many
hoped that the Court would reconsider the Manson reliability framework.
22
Despite the need to reconsider Manson, Perry proved to be the wrong
case for this undertaking from the beginning. The issue in Perry was narrow,
namely, whether suggestive circumstances that are not created by the police
can satisfy the first prong of the Manson test.23 Perry was convicted of steal-
ing car-stereo speakers out of a vehicle in a parking lot.24 The eyewitness
identified Perry on her own while Perry stood next to a police officer at the
scene of the crime.25 Perry was the only suspect the witness saw, but the
suggestive circumstances were unintentional.
18. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Proce-
dures and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later,
33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 16 (2009) ("[N]one of the five criteria are unequivocally related to
the accuracy of identifications."); see also Suzannah B. Gambell, Comment, The Need to Re-
visit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 Wyo. L.
REV. 189, 196-202, 217-20 (2006).
19. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 576-77 (Kan. 2003); State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991).
20. Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a
New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41
VAL. U. L. REv. 109, 113 (2006).
21. 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
22. For example, Jennifer Thompson, the victim in the case where Ronald Cotton was
wrongfully convicted, see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text, signed onto an amicus
brief in Perry urging the Court to provide a more rigorous analysis of reliability "in order to
prevent sincere but mistaken identifications from leading juries astray in their determination of
the truth" Brief of Amici Curiae Wilton Dedge et al. in Support of Petitioner at 5, Perry, 132
S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 3584756, at *5.
23. 132 S. Ct. at 723-24.
24. Id. at 722.
25. Id. ("[The officer] asked [the eyewitness] for a more specific description of the man.
[The eyewitness] pointed to her kitchen window and said the person she saw breaking into
[the] car was standing in the parking lot, next to the police officer.").
June 20131 1539
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The narrow issue concerning the source of the suggestive circumstances
did not provide an opportunity for a direct review of Manson. Nor did the
Court show any interest in reviewing the Manson standard's continued via-
bility. The Court ruled against Perry based on the first step of the Manson
test, finding that due process concerns were not implicated when an
"identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circum-
stances arranged by law enforcement." 6 Having found that the identification
was not obtained by means of suggestive police conduct, the Court did not
analyze the reliability of the identification under the second Manson step.
Along with the narrowness of the issue presented, Perry proved to be an
inadequate vehicle for reconsidering the Manson test because the challenged
identification was not the only evidence against the defendant-in such
cases, eyewitness evidence is of the utmost concern. In Perry's case, there
was other evidence linking him to the crime.27 Further, another unchallenged
witness identified Perry as the person he saw walking around the parking lot
looking into cars.2 8 The challenged identification provided but "one ...
brick in the wall of evidence."29 Perry's was not a sympathetic case, and the
Supreme Court could affirm the decision of the lower court without worry-
ing that an innocent man had been convicted.
The Court made almost no mention of the continued vitality of Manson
in light of the social science developments of the previous thirty-five years.30
As described in an amicus brief from the Innocence Network, "[Iln the dec-
ades since this Court last addressed the issue, the Manson reliability test has
not met the objectives the Court set for it."31 The Supreme Court effectively
avoided this issue altogether, passing on an analysis of the Manson rule by
instead focusing only on the narrow issue of whether the test required the
police to have caused the suggestive circumstances. Despite recognizing
"the importance [and] the fallibility of eyewitness identifications,"32 the
Court did not revisit the Manson framework. As an apparent concession,
26. Id. at 730.
27. Perry was found at the scene of the crime with the stolen stereo speakers in his
possession and a tool in his pocket that the victim kept in her vehicle. Brief Amicus Curiae of
the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Respondent at 26, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716
(No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 4479078, at *26.
28. Id. at 27, 2011 WL 4479078, at *27.
29. Id.
30. The Court did mention by way of parenthetical "studies showing that eyewitness
misidentifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions." 132 S. Ct. at 728. The only
real mention of any of the empirical developments since Manson is in Justice Sotomayor's
dissent. Id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("A vast body of scientific literature has rein-
forced every concern our precedents articulated nearly a half-century ago, though it merits
barely a parenthetical mention in the majority opinion.").
31. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner, Supporting
Reversal at 11, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 3439922, at *11.
32. 132 S. Ct. at 728.
1540 [Vol.l 111:1535
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however, the Court noted and accepted some safeguards against mistaken
eyewitness identifications used by some states.
33
What conclusions are to be drawn from the Perry decision? It certainly
was not a victory for those calling for a more careful review of the admissi-
bility standard for eyewitness identifications. Instead, the Court seemed to
complicate the reliability analysis by focusing on the source of the sugges-
tive identification.34 However, the effect of the decision might be muted by
the fact that "[t]he vast majority of eyewitness identifications that the State
uses in criminal prosecutions are obtained in lineup, showup, and photo-
graph displays arranged by the police. '35 In any event, after thirty-five years
of silence, the failure to actually address the hard questions surrounding
eyewitness identifications is surely a disappointment and a setback in light
of the overwhelming evidence that change needs to be made.
On the other hand, there is more to the story than what appears on the
face of the Perry opinion. While the majority did not directly mention any of
the recent developments in the eyewitness identification field, the Court was
certainly aware of them. Amicus briefs were filed by the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers,36 the Innocence Network,37 and the
American Psychological Association,38 each of which highlighted the prob-
lems with Manson and the need for greater safeguards pertaining to
eyewitness evidence. Most significantly, shortly before the Court heard oral
argument in Perry, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided a seminal case
that directly addressed all of the hard questions that would be left unan-
swered in Perry.3 9 The Perry Court was aware of the decision. 40 The
movement of state courts in addressing the Manson problems is certainly
relevant in providing context for the Supreme Court's decision in Perry.
There is nothing in Perry that indicates a willingness by the Court to
take on another eyewitness identification case anytime soon. This does not
mean, however, that the Court's ruling is the last word on possible
33. See id. at 729 ("In appropriate cases, some States also permit defendants to present
expert testimony on the hazards of eyewitness identification evidence.").
34. See id. at 725 (noting that if reliability is indeed the "linchpin" of eyewitness identi-
fication, "it should make no difference whether law enforcement was responsible for creating
the suggestive circumstances that marred the identification").
35. Id. at 735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
36. Brief of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 3511016.
37. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner, Supporting
Reversal, supra note 31, 2011 WL 3439922.
38. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n in Support of Petitioner,
Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 3488994.
39. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
40. Many of the briefs filed in Perry discussed the recent New Jersey case. See, e.g.,
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Respondent,
supra note 27, at 19-20, 30, 2011 WL 4479078, at "19-20, *30; Brief of Amicus Curiae the
Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner, Supporting Reversal, supra note 31, at 20, 2011
WL 3439922, at *20.
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safeguards for eyewitness testimony. The Court recognized the role of state
and lower federal courts in weighing such evidence, and approvingly noted
the efforts of lower courts to keep unreliable evidence out.4 The Perry deci-
sion by no means foreclosed, and indeed seemed to encourage, a critical
analysis of the Manson test by lower courts. The Court's deferral on the
question of the viability of the Manson framework requires lower courts to
bear the burden of a critical analysis of current eyewitness evidence practic-
es. Fortunately, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recently provided an
ideal example of how lower courts should approach these tough issues.
III. STATE V HENDERSON: A CORRECT MEASURE OF RELIABILITY
This Part analyzes the approach to eyewitness evidence taken by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Henderson42 and describes the court's
revised framework as a remedy to the Perry Court's failure to revisit Man-
son. It then compares the Perry and Henderson opinions and concludes that
Perry indicated where reform must come from, while Henderson outlined
what reform should look like.
The New Jersey Supreme Court "has long been considered a trailblazer
in criminal law."43 In Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court answered
the hard questions avoided by the U.S. Supreme Court and provided a sharp
criticism of the Manson framework. The Henderson decision shows that
scientific research can and should be used in the court system to develop
procedures that will provide adequate protection against mistaken identifica-
tions. While the decision need not be adopted line-by-line in every
jurisdiction, the process of critically analyzing the issue of unreliable identi-
fications and proposing a solution based on science and experience is one
that should be emulated in courtrooms and by police agencies across the
country.
The New Jersey case arose out of a murder conviction where the eyewit-
ness identified the defendant out of a photo array conducted at the
prosecutor's office." The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing to deter-
mine the admissibility of the identification.45 The trial judge relied on a
model jury charge allowing the jury to find that the photo identification was
reliable, but the Appellate Division reversed.46 In a unique move, the New
41. 132 S. Ct. at 728.
42. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
43. Benjamin Weiser, In New Jersey, Sweeping Shifts on Witness IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 2011, at Al, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/nyregion/in-new-jersey-rules-changed-
on-witness-ids.html.
44. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 880-81.
45. Id. at 881-82.
46. Id. at 882-84 (noting that the Appellate Division found the identification procedure
to be impermissibly suggestive under New Jersey's version of the Manson test). The reversal
was primarily due to a breach of the Attorney General Guidelines that required the person
conducting the identification to be someone other than the primary investigator assigned to the
case "whenever practical." Id.
1542 [Vol. 111: 1535
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Jersey Supreme Court remanded the case "to consider and decide whether
the assumptions and other factors reflected in the two-part Manson[] test, as
well as the five factors outlined in those cases to determine reliability, re-
main valid and appropriate in light of recent scientific and other evidence.
47
The New Jersey Supreme Court directed a Special Master to preside at
the remand hearing. The Special Master was tasked with making findings of
fact on the status of scientific eyewitness evidence studies and providing a
recommendation as to whether New Jersey should continue with the Man-
son rule or adopt a new framework for assessing the reliability of eyewitness
identifications. The hearing involved an exhaustive review of scientific re-
search on eyewitness identification and included 360 exhibits, 200 published
scientific studies, and testimony from 7 expert witnesses.4 8
Over a year after the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its remand order,
the Special Master released his report from the hearings.49 The report direct-
ly answered the most pressing issue: "The short answer to the Court's
question whether the Manson[] test and procedures are 'valid and appropri-
ate in light of recent scientific and other evidence' is that they are not."
50
The report found that "scientific findings can and should be used to assist
judges and juries in the difficult task of assessing the reliability of eyewit-
ness identifications" and that "the Manson[] test does not provide that
needed assistance."''1 The report also listed "specific inadequacies" of the
Manson framework. These flaws included addressing only suggestive pro-
cedures that were the result of state action (the issue in Perry), allowing
suppression of eyewitness identification as the sole remedy, and using relia-
bility factors that "are themselves unreliable.
''52
In addition to pointing out the flaws with Manson's approach, the report
also recommended two specific procedural remedies. First, the prosecution
should have the initial burden of producing evidence at a pretrial hearing on
the reliability of the identification.53 This requirement of a pretrial hearing
and shifting of the burden essentially eliminates Manson's dictate that the
reliability of an identification will only be examined after a showing of im-
permissible suggestion. 54 Second, judges and juries must be informed and
guided by scientific findings.55 The scientific findings should be adopted and
used "in deciding admissibility issues; in promulgating jury instructions
47. Order, 39 A.3d 147, 148 (2009), reprinted in Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 app. A at
930.
48. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 884.
49. Report of the Special Master, Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (No. A-8-08), available
at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/HENDERSON%2OFINAL%20BRIEF%20.PDF%
20(00621142).PDF.
50. Id. at 79 (quoting Order, 39 A.3d at 148).
51. Id. at 76.
52. Id. at 77-79.
53. Id. at 84.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 85.
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addressing specific variables; in broadening voir dire questioning; and in
allowing appropriate expert testimony in all phases of the litigation."56
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the Special Master's report,
concluding that scientific evidence is "both reliable and useful. '57 The court
also concluded that the Manson rule "does not adequately meet its stated
goals: it does not provide a sufficient measure for reliability, it does not de-
ter, and it overstates the jury's innate ability to evaluate eyewitness
testimony."
58
The Henderson court announced a revised framework with two principle
changes based on the recommendations of the Special Master's report:
"[F]irst, the revised framework should allow all relevant [factors] to be ex-
plored and weighed at pretrial hearings when there is some actual evidence
of suggestiveness; and second, courts should develop and use enhanced jury
charges to help jurors evaluate eyewitness identification evidence."59 Under
the first change, more than a dozen factors may be considered by a judge
during the pretrial hearing in evaluating the reliability of an identification.
60
During this pretrial hearing, "trial courts should make factual findings"
about the relevant variables "to lay the groundwork for proper jury charges
and to facilitate meaningful appellate review."61 This approach differs great-
ly from Manson. It allows courts to look beyond a short checklist of factors
and to engage instead in a comprehensive reliability review. It also allows
courts to properly inform juries about the fallibility of eyewitness identifica-
tions and encourages jurors to give proper weight to such evidence.
Henderson did not overrule Manson-a state court cannot overrule the
U.S. Supreme Court on matters of federal law. However, as New Jersey has
shown, a state court can guarantee more protection under a state constitution
than the Supreme Court is currently providing under the federal due process
clause. To be clear, Henderson is based on the New Jersey Constitution.
Basing additional safeguards on a state constitution is the pathway to follow
for other states that wish to provide more protection than Manson.
A key point here is that suppression of a potentially unreliable identifi-
cation is not the preferred remedy. The court made it clear that "[t]he
threshold for suppression remains high" and that "in the vast majority of
cases, identification evidence will likely be presented to the jury."62 The
remedy, then, is for judges to admit disputed identification evidence, but
give the jury detailed instructions about "factors that can lead to misidentifi-
56. Id. at 86.
57. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 916 (N.J. 2011).
58. Id. at918.
59. Id. at919.
60. See id. at 920-22. These factors include system variables-such as blind admin-
istration of lineup procedures, pre-identification instructions, and lineup construction-and
estimator variables-such as stress, duration, and race-bias.
61. Id. at 923-24.
62. Id. at 928.
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cations" 63 The court provided a comprehensive review of various reliability
factors in order to aid in the development of model jury instructions.
64
The Henderson decision has been praised by those seeking reform in the
way eyewitness evidence is handled. Barry Scheck, co-director of the Inno-
cence Project, stated, "The court has recognized the tremendous fallibility of
eyewitness identifications, and based on the most thorough review of scien-
tific research undertaken by a court, has set up comprehensive and practical
guidelines for how judges and juries should handle this important
evidence."'65 Henderson certainly represents the most direct and significant
repudiation of the outdated Manson framework.
Henderson, not Perry, is the wave of the future. While Perry remained
silent on critical issues, Henderson attacked directly-creating a modem
framework to evaluate eyewitness evidence that is in line with the scientific
studies of the past thirty-five years. The Supreme Court's decision in Perry
should be read as encouraging the type of problem solving engaged in by
the Henderson court. Already aware of the landmark decision in New Jersey,
the Perry decision signals the Supreme Court's hesitation to tackle the tough
questions and its willingness to allow lower courts to follow New Jersey's
lead in replacing the outdated Manson test.
The Henderson decision should provide a model for other states to fol-
low. Professor Garrett commented that the decision "would provide a model
for legislatures and courts around the country that 'have been at a loss for
what to do' and need[] 'a structure for how judges should handle identifica-
tions in the courtroom.' "66 Innocence Project Co-Director Scheck also
commented that the case is "going to affect the way every state and federal
court in the United States assesses eyewitness identification evidence, and
what those courts tell juries about the factors that can increase the risk of
misidentification."
67
It is clear that Henderson is already creating waves in eyewitness evi-
dence jurisprudence. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently
discussed the New Jersey decision and noted the formation of a "study
committee on eyewitness identification" to consider alternative approaches,
including the approach established in Henderson.6" Likewise, the Henderson
decision was cited heavily by proponents of eyewitness reform before the
Supreme Court of Washington.69 Elsewhere, the Innocence Project of
63. Id.
64. Id. at921-22.
65. Paul Cates, New Jersey Supreme Court Issues Landmark Decision Mandating Ma-
jor Changes in the Way Courts Handle Identification Procedures, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/NewJerseySupreme
Court Issues LandmarkDecisionMandatingMajorChanges-in-theWayCourtsHandle
_IdentificationProcedures.php.
66. Weiser, supra note 43, at Al.
67. Id.
68. Commonwealth v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195,209-10 (Mass. 2011).
69. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner passim, State v. Allen, No. 86119-6, 2013 WL
259383 (Wash. Jan. 24, 2013) (en banc), 2011 WL 7005405 passim.
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Florida referenced the Henderson decision in stating that "[t]his is the result
we want to see in Florida if we have coordinated, consistent, high-level ad-
vocacy from defenders at all stages of the criminal process."7 It seems
likely that Henderson will continue to influence other states as they search
for an alternative to the Manson approach for handling eyewitness evidence.
Henderson should be viewed as the guidepost that many hoped Perry
would be. The New Jersey Supreme Court has provided the most thorough
analysis of the problems with the Manson approach and has created the
framework best suited to handle the dangers of eyewitness evidence. State
and federal courts should take notice of the shortcomings of Manson and
turn to Henderson for the development of a new approach to eyewitness
identification evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Manson standard for determining the admissibility of eyewitness
identifications is outdated and ineffective in protecting against mistaken
identifications. Because the Court refused to revisit the standard in Perry,
reform must come from the states. The New Jersey Supreme Court provided
a model for reforming eyewitness identification procedures by focusing on a
more thorough review of reliability at the pretrial stage and using detailed
jury instructions to assist jurors in giving proper weight to eyewitness evi-
dence. State courts should heed the Henderson example in developing a new
framework for eyewitness identification evidence.
70. Seth Miller, Landmark NJ Case Paves Path Forward on Evaluating Reliability of
IDs, INNOCENCE PROJECT FLA. (August 25, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://floridainnocence.org/
content/?p=4633.
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